|
LECTURE 6: THE
QUESTION OF FAILED STATES
A failed state is a state whose
central government is so weak or ineffective that it has little practical
control over much of its territory. The level of control required to avoid being
considered a failed state varies considerably amongst authorities.[1] Furthermore, the declaration that a
state has "failed" is generally controversial and, when made authoritatively,
may carry significant geopolitical consequences.A state could be said to "succeed" if it maintains, in the words of Max Weber, a monopoly on the
legitimate use of physical force within its borders. When this is broken
(e.g., through the dominant presence of warlords, militias, or terrorism), the very existence of the state becomes
dubious, and the state becomes a failed state. The difficulty of
determining whether a government maintains "a monopoly on the legitimate use of
force" (which includes the problems of the definition of "legitimate") means it
is not clear precisely when a state can be said to have "failed." This problem
of legitimacy can be solved by understanding what Weber intended by it. Weber
clearly explains that only the state has the means of production necessary for
physical violence (politics as vocation). This means that the state does not
require legitimacy for achieving monopoly on the means of violence (de facto)
but will need one if it needs to use it (de jure).
The term is also used in the sense of a state that has been rendered
ineffective (i.e., has nominal military/police control over its territory only
in the sense of having no armed opposition groups directly challenging state
authority; in short, the "no news is good news" approach) and is not able to
enforce its laws uniformly because of high crime rates, extreme political
corruption, an extensive informal market, impenetrable bureaucracy,
judicial ineffectiveness, military interference in politics, cultural situations
in which traditional leaders wield more power than the state over a certain area
but do not compete with the state, or a number of other factors.
The Crisis States Research Centre
defines a “failed state” as a condition of “state collapse” – e.g. a state that can no longer perform its basic
security and development functions and that has no effective control over its
territory and borders. A failed state is one that can no longer reproduce the
conditions for its own existence. This term is used in very contradictory ways
in the policy community (for instance, there is a tendency to label a “poorly
performing” state as “failed” – a tendency the Crisis States Research Centre
rejects). The opposite of a “failed state” is an “enduring state” and the
absolute dividing line between these two conditions is difficult to ascertain at
the margins. Even in a failed state, some elements of the state, such as local
state organisations, might continue to exist.
Since 2005 the United
States think-tank, the Fund for Peace and the
magazine Foreign
Policy, publishes an annual index called the Failed States Index.
The list only assesses sovereign states (determined by membership in the United
Nations.)[2] Several territories are excluded until
their political status and UN membership is ratified in international law. For
example: Taiwan, the Palestinian Territories, Northern Cyprus, Kosovo, and Western Sahara are not included in the list -
even though some are recognized as sovereign states by some nations. Ranking is
based on the total scores of the 12 indicators (see below.) For each indicator,
the ratings are placed on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the lowest intensity
(most stable) and 10 being the highest intensity (least stable). The total score
is the sum of the 12 indicators and is on a scale of 0-120.[2]
The index's ranks are based on twelve indicators of state vulnerability -
four social, two economic and six political.[3] The indicators are
not designed to forecast when states may experience violence or collapse.
Instead, they are meant to measure a state's vulnerability to collapse or
conflict. All countries in the red, orange, or yellow categories display some
features that make parts of their societies and institutions vulnerable to
failure. Some in the yellow zone may be failing at a faster rate than those in
the more dangerous orange or red zones, and therefore could experience violence
sooner. Conversely, some in the red zone, though critical, may exhibit some
positive signs of recovery or be deteriorating slowly, giving them time to adopt
mitigating strategies.[2]
1. Demographic pressures: including the pressures deriving from high
population density relative to food supply and other life-sustaining resources.
The pressure from a population's settlement patterns and physical settings,
including border disputes, ownership or occupancy of land, access to
transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites, and proximity
to environmental hazards.[4]
2. Massive movement of refugees and internally displaced peoples:
forced uprooting of large communities as a result of random or targeted violence
and/or repression, causing food shortages, disease, lack of clean water, land
competition, and turmoil that can spiral into larger humanitarian and security
problems, both within and between countries.[5]
3. Legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance: based on recent or
past injustices, which could date back centuries. Including atrocities committed
with impunity against communal groups and/or specific groups singled out by
state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression.
Institutionalized political exclusion. Public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired
wealth, status or power as evidenced in the emergence of "hate" radio,
pamphleteering and stereotypical or nationalistic political rhetoric.[6]
4. Chronic and sustained human flight: both the "brain drain" of professionals,
intellectuals and political dissidents and voluntary emigration of "the middle
class." Growth of exile/expat
communities are also used as part of this indicator.[7]
5. Uneven economic development along group lines: determined by
group-based inequality, or perceived inequality, in education, jobs, and
economic status. Also measured by group-based poverty levels, infant mortality
rates, education levels.[8]
6. Sharp and/or severe economic decline: measured by a progressive
economic decline of the society as a whole (using: per capita income, GNP, debt,
child mortality rates, poverty levels, business failures.) A sudden drop in
commodity prices, trade revenue, foreign investment or debt payments. Collapse
or devaluation of the national currency and a growth of hidden economies,
including the drug trade, smuggling, and capital flight. Failure of the state to
pay salaries of government employees and armed forces or to meet other financial
obligations to its citizens, such as pension payments.[9]
7. Criminalization and/or delegitimisation of the state: endemic
corruption or profiteering by ruling elites and resistance to transparency,
accountability and political representation. Includes any widespread loss of
popular confidence in state institutions and processes.[10]
8. Progressive deterioration of public services: a disappearance of
basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect
citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as
health, education, sanitation, public transportation. Also using the state
apparatus for agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security
forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and
collection agencies.[11]
9. Widespread violation of human rights: an emergence of
authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and
democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated. Outbreaks of
politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent
civilians. A rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied
due process consistent with international norms and practices. Any widespread
abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals,
groups or cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, politicization
of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression
of political opponents, religious or cultural persecution.)[12]
10. Security apparatus as ‘state within a state’: an emergence of
elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity.
Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize
political opponents, suspected "enemies," or civilians seen to be sympathetic to
the opposition. An "army within an army" that serves the interests of the
dominant military or political clique. Emergence of rival militias, guerilla
forces or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns
against state security forces.[13]
11. Rise of factionalised elites: a fragmentation of ruling elites and
state institutions along group lines. Any use of nationalistic political
rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism or of communal
solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith.")[14]
12. Intervention of other states or external factors: military or
Para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside
armies, states, identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of
power or resolution of the conflict. Intervention by donors, especially if there
is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping
missions.[15]
177 states were included in the list, of which 35 were classified as "alert",
92 as "warning", 35 as "moderate", 15 as "sustainable". The worst 20 states are
shown below. Change in rank from 2007 is shown in parentheses.[16]
READING
FOR THE NEXT LECTURE
Return
to Gst 303
|
Prof.
A. Belousov
|